History in 5 Minutes or less

Prelude to Crisis: Europe on the Brink

By the summer of 1938, Europe was once again on the edge of war. Adolf Hitler, having violated the Treaty of Versailles repeatedly—first by rearming Germany, then reoccupying the Rhineland in 1936, and finally annexing Austria in March 1938 (the Anschluss)—was now setting his sights on Czechoslovakia. Specifically, he targeted the Sudetenland, a region home to over three million ethnic Germans.

Hitler claimed these Germans were being oppressed by the Czech government and demanded that the territory be annexed by Germany. But the Sudetenland wasn’t just a linguistic or cultural issue; it was the cornerstone of Czechoslovakia’s national defense. The region was heavily fortified, home to key military installations, and formed a crucial part of its border security. Losing it would render the country virtually defenseless.

The European powers were deeply anxious. Memories of World War I were still fresh, and no one was eager to engage in another large-scale conflict. Many leaders, particularly in Britain and France, believed the Treaty of Versailles had been too harsh and that Germany’s grievances might be legitimate. Among those most dedicated to preserving peace was British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.

First Encounter: Berghof, September 15, 1938

Neville Chamberlain made a decision that stunned the world. At age 69, and with no prior experience in international diplomacy, he flew across the English Channel to meet with Hitler personally—the first time a British Prime Minister had ever done such a thing in peacetime. He believed that through personal diplomacy he could resolve the crisis.

The meeting took place at the Berghof, Hitler’s mountaintop retreat near Berchtesgaden in Bavaria. It was a dramatic setting for a historic encounter. Hitler, bullish and unyielding, presented himself as the defender of oppressed Germans and demanded the Sudetenland be turned over to Germany. He assured Chamberlain that this was his last territorial claim in Europe.

Caught off-guard by Hitler’s vehemence but eager to avoid war, Chamberlain agreed in principle to the idea of transferring the Sudetenland—on the condition that the process be peaceful and internationally sanctioned. He returned to Britain hopeful that he had averted war and began working with French leaders to present a joint proposal to the Czechoslovak government.

Under intense Anglo-French pressure, Czech President Edvard Beneš reluctantly agreed to the territorial concessions. However, he was not consulted directly by the leaders who would decide his country’s fate.

Second Act: Bad Godesberg, September 22–23, 1938

Chamberlain returned to Germany a week later, believing he was bringing Hitler the good news of an agreement. This time, the meeting was held in the spa town of Bad Godesberg, near Bonn. But instead of gratitude, Chamberlain was met with a furious Hitler who declared that the plan was now insufficient.

Hitler now demanded immediate military occupation of the Sudetenland. He rejected any notion of international oversight and declared that if his terms were not met by September 28, Germany would invade Czechoslovakia. The tone of the meeting shifted from diplomatic negotiation to barely veiled threats.

Chamberlain was alarmed. He returned to London convinced that Hitler might actually be willing to risk a European war. Britain began mobilizing its fleet. France also began preparations. Cities across Britain held air-raid drills. Gas masks were distributed to civilians. The public braced for a repeat of 1914.

Chamberlain gave a grim address to the British people, stating that Hitler’s new demands were “unreasonable” and that war was a real possibility. His confidence from the first meeting was shattered.

The Last Gambit: Munich Conference, September 29–30, 1938

In a last-ditch effort to avert war, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini proposed a four-power conference. It was held in Munich on September 29, 1938. The attendees were Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain, and French Premier Édouard Daladier. Missing from the table were representatives of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union—a snub that would resonate for years.

At the conference, Hitler moderated his tone slightly, knowing that his position was strong. Chamberlain and Daladier, unwilling to plunge their nations into war for a small country they hardly knew, agreed to Hitler’s terms. The Munich Agreement allowed for the Sudetenland to be annexed by Germany beginning October 1, with international commissions to decide any disputes.

In return, Hitler signed a separate declaration with Chamberlain, promising that Germany had no further territorial ambitions in Europe. Chamberlain believed this paper was a promise of lasting peace.

When Chamberlain returned to Britain the next day, he was met with cheers and relief. At Heston Aerodrome, he famously declared, “Peace for our time,” holding up the agreement as proof that diplomacy had triumphed. The phrase, however, would soon become a symbol of dangerous naiveté.

Fallout and Betrayal: Czechoslovakia Dismembered

The Munich Agreement had enormous consequences. For Czechoslovakia, it was a disaster. Stripped of its border defenses, major industrial zones, and fortified terrain, the country was left at the mercy of its neighbors. Within months, Poland and Hungary seized additional territory.

In March 1939, Hitler broke the Munich Agreement entirely by ordering German troops to march into Prague. The rest of Czechoslovakia became a German protectorate. There was no pretense of ethnic solidarity this time; it was a naked act of imperial conquest.

The West was shocked. Chamberlain felt personally betrayed. He now realized that Hitler could not be trusted and that appeasement had failed. Britain and France issued new guarantees to other countries, particularly Poland. When Hitler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, Chamberlain had no choice. Two days later, Britain and France declared war on Germany.

Chamberlain’s Legacy: Misjudgment or Realpolitik?

For decades, Chamberlain was vilified as the man who failed to stand up to Hitler. Critics accused him of cowardice, naïveté, or outright failure. Yet in recent years, historians have taken a more nuanced view.

In 1938, Britain was not ready for war. Its army was small, its air force underdeveloped, and its people overwhelmingly opposed to another conflict. Chamberlain may have understood that buying time was the best option available. In the year between Munich and the invasion of Poland, Britain rearmed significantly. The Royal Air Force, in particular, became a formidable force that would prove crucial in 1940.

Still, Chamberlain’s error was in trusting Hitler’s word and believing that rational diplomacy could work with an irrational dictator. He misjudged not only Hitler’s ambitions but also the moral cost of sacrificing smaller nations for short-term peace.

Chamberlain remained Prime Minister until May 1940, when Winston Churchill replaced him following the disastrous Norway campaign. Chamberlain died of cancer later that year, a broken man, haunted by the consequences of his decisions.

Epilogue: Peace, at a Terrible Price

The Munich Agreement has become one of history’s most enduring cautionary tales. It symbolizes the dangers of appeasement and the high price of ignoring the warnings of aggression.

Yet Chamberlain’s legacy is not so easily dismissed. He was a man shaped by the horrors of the First World War and driven by a sincere desire to spare his country another one. His approach was tragically flawed, but it was born not of weakness, but of a desperate hope that diplomacy might succeed where war had once failed.

Churchill, his fiercest critic, eventually acknowledged Chamberlain’s integrity and sacrifice. In a speech to Parliament after Chamberlain’s death, Churchill said:

“It fell to Neville Chamberlain, in one of the supreme crises of the world, to be contradicted by events, to be disappointed in his hopes, and to be deceived and cheated by a wicked man. But what were these hopes in which he was disappointed? What were they but hopes for the welfare of his country?”

Sources

• Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Simon & Schuster, 1960.
• Gilbert, Martin. The Appeasers. Phoenix Press, 2000.
• Roberts, Andrew. The Storm of War. HarperCollins, 2011.
• Kershaw, Ian. Hitler: A Biography. W. W. Norton & Company, 2008.
• Taylor, A.J.P. The Origins of the Second World War. Penguin Books, 1961.